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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) has appealed 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
General Electric Company (GE) on Sea-Land's tort claims in 
admiralty for economic loss. The district court dismissed 
the case based on the holding of the Supreme Court in East 
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 
S.Ct. 2295 (1986), that under maritime law no claim lies for 
either negligence or strict products liability when a 
commercial party alleges injury only to a product itself, 
resulting in purely economic loss. Id. at 2302. 
 
In this appeal, we must decide 1) whether a defective 
part, a connecting rod, that caused damage to its 
surrounding engine was separate property from the engine 
or was merely a component of the engine; 2) whether East 
River bars a tort claim for post-sale duty to warn under a 
negligence theory when the damage is purely economic; and 
3) whether East River bars a tort claim for negligent repair 
when the damage is purely economic. The district court 
held 1) that the rod was not separate property  from the 
engine, within the meaning of East River, and that East 
River precluded tort recovery for economic loss as a result 
of a product damaging itself; 2) that even when the injury 
is only economic, there is a post-sale duty-to-warn claim if 
a defendant-manufacturer had actual knowledge that the 
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product was defective, but that GE did not have actual 
knowledge of the defective part prior to Sea-Land's injury; 
and 3) that East River bars a tort claim for negligent repair 
when the damage is purely economic. 
 
I. Facts 
 
Sea-Land is a bareboat charterer of many vessels 
including the Sea-Land Enterprise. The Enterprise was 
constructed in 1980, and Sea-Land purchased it in 1988 
from U.S. Lines. The Enterprise has two ship's service 
generators, a ship's service turbine generator and a ship's 
service diesel generator (SSDG). The Enterprise's SSDG is 
powered by a GE diesel engine. The diesel engine is made 
up of "life-cycle" parts, which a vessel operator would not 
expect to replace, and "renewable" parts, which must be 
replaced periodically. In December, 1990, Sea-Land 
overhauled the Enterprise's diesel engine, procuring 105 GE 
parts including eight GE master connecting rods. On 
February 26, 1991, after only 47 hours of operation by the 
overhauled diesel engine, it broke down, causing damage to 
the engine and the engine casing. 
 
The cause of the failure, as admitted by GE, was one of 
the 8 connecting rods. The rod had failed because the 
meloniting process, used to harden it, was faulty. GE 
replaced all the suspect connecting rods and repaired the 
engine free of charge. Coincidentally, on February 8, 1991, 
eighteen days before the Enterprise engine failure, a similar 
defective connecting rod had caused a diesel engine on the 
United States Navy Ship Albert Meyer to break down. It 
later occurred that in November 1994 the Enterprise 
suffered a further breakdown of the SSDG. Sea-Land 
alleges that the 1994 engine failure was at the same 
location as GE's 1991 engine block repair and was due to 
negligent repair by GE. 
 
Sea-Land brought suit against GE to recover for the 
losses caused by the two engine failures. In Count I, Sea- 
Land alleges that the GE connecting rod was defective and 
claims the profits it lost while the ship was inoperable until 
the 1991 repairs had been completed. In Count II, Sea- 
Land asserts that GE negligently failed to warn Sea-Land of 
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a potentially defective connecting rod of which it had 
knowledge by virtue of the Albert Meyer engine failure. In 
Count IV, Sea-Land contends that GE breached its duty of 
care to Sea-Land by negligently performing the 1991 repair. 
As a result, Sea-Land claims the cost of repair of the engine 
in 1994 and the profits it lost while the ship was once again 
inoperable. 
 
On April 26, 1996, the district court granted summary 
judgment to GE on Count I, finding that the defective GE 
rod was the proximate cause of injury to Sea Land but that 
East River barred a tort claim for lost profits. On April 17, 
1997, the district court granted summary judgment to GE 
on all other counts, including failure to warn and negligent 
repair. This consolidated appeal followed. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over this civil case in 
admiralty. 28 U.S.C. S 1333. We have appellate jurisdiction 
from final decisions of district courts. 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
II. Is The Product the Rod Or The Engine 
 
We address first Sea-Land's tort claim for economic loss 
due to a dangerously defective part manufactured by GE. 
The Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2295 (1986), held 
that, under admiralty law, a cause of action in tort does not 
lie "when a defective product, purchased in a commercial 
transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself 
and causing purely economic loss." Id. at 2296. Thus, a 
"manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty 
under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory 
to prevent a product from injuring itself." Id. at 2302. If 
such a product is defective, the purchaser will generally 
have a contract claim for breach of warranty. 
 
In the instant case, one of the engine components, a 
connecting rod, was defective and damaged other parts of 
the engine. The question we must answer is "What is the 
product?" If the product, within the meaning of East River, 
is "a properly functioning engine," the product only caused 
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economic damage, i.e., damage to itself and lost profits. If 
the product is the rod, plaintiffs allege that it caused 
damage to "other property," i.e., to the engine. Should this 
be the case, then under East River a tort claim may lie and 
the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I 
in favor of GE was erroneous. 
 
In East River, the defendant manufactured engine 
turbines, installed in cargo ships. The turbine (or a 
component thereof) failed, causing damage to the turbine 
itself. Plaintiff sued in tort for recovery of the cost of repair 
and the lost income for the period in which the ship was 
out of service. The Court explained the policy 
considerations underlying tort and contract liability. Tort 
liability protects people from dangerous products. In 
particular, the tort theory of products liability arose from a 
concern that the public needed more protection from 
dangerous products than contracts or warranties could 
provide. Id. at 2299-300. The tort concern with safety is 
reduced, however, when a product injures only itself, id. at 
2302, but does not injure persons or "other" property. The 
damages then are only the loss of the value of the product 
itself and the profits lost when it cannot be used. In such 
a case, because there is no duty to the public in general, it 
is not inequitable to limit the remedy between the parties to 
what they have bargained for. The parties can agree 
between themselves on the limits of their obligations and 
liabilities. They can take appropriate steps through contract 
provisions and/or insurance to protect themselves from 
foreseeable risks. Based on these policy considerations, the 
Court concluded that, when a product (the turbine) 
damages only itself, there is no tort recovery; only warranty 
recovery. Id. at 2303. 
 
The present case differs from East River in that Sea-Land 
claims that the connecting rod did not just damage itself, it 
damaged other property, i.e., the diesel engine and its 
casing. We must determine whether this is a difference with 
a significance. 
 
The Supreme Court has partially clarified the East River 
property/other property dichotomy in Saratoga Fishing Co. 
v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S.Ct. 1783 (1997). In Saratoga, 
a primary purchaser of a ship had added to it a skiff, a 
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fishing net, and spare parts. The vessel, with the added 
equipment as a part of it, was subsequently sold to a 
secondary purchaser, Saratoga. An engine room fire led to 
the sinking of the ship, and a faulty hydraulic system was 
determined to be a significant cause of the sinking. 
Saratoga sued the manufacturer of the hydraulic system 
and the company that built the vessel. The issue was 
whether the added equipment was "other property" under 
East River so that Saratoga might recover damages for its 
destruction. The Court held that the added equipment was 
"other property": 
 
       When a Manufacturer places an item in the stream of 
       commerce by selling it to an Initial User, that item is 
       the "product itself " under East River. Items added to 
       the product by the Initial User are therefore "other 
       property," and the Initial User's sale of the product to 
       a Subsequent User does not change these 
       characterizations. 
 
Id. at 1786. Accord Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. v. General 
Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
ship charterer, who adds expensive seismic equipment to 
the ship, may recover for its loss in a fire caused by a 
defective engine). 
 
The manufacturer in Saratoga had argued that"if a 
[subsequent purchaser] can recover for damage that a 
defectively manufactured product causes to property added 
by the [initial user], than a user might recover for damage 
a defective component causes the manufactured product, 
other than the component itself." Id. at 1788. The Court 
explicitly rejected this position, holding that it is not the 
various component parts, but the vessel itself as placed in 
the stream of commerce by the manufacturer and 
distributor that is the "product." Id. citing Shipco 2295, Inc. 
v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 
1987). Citing East River, the Court concluded that, because 
almost all machines are made up of components, to define 
"other property" differently would "require a finding of 
`property damage' in virtually every case where a product 
damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the 
distinction between warranty and strict products liability." 
117 S.Ct. at 1788, quoting 106 S.Ct. at 2300. 
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In this expansion of East River, the Court drew a 
distinction between components added to a product by a 
manufacturer before the product's sale to a user, see, e.g., 
King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(Pennsylvania law), Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale 
Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1987) (federal 
maritime law); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 
835 F.Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Haw. 1993) (admiralty law) 
(dubbing the rule in these cases, the "integrated product" 
rule), and those items added by a subsequent user to the 
manufactured product, see, e.g., Nicor Supply Ships Assocs. 
v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Saratoga 117 S.Ct. at 1788. 
 
This distinction is consistent with the "object of the 
bargain" test, applied by this Circuit. King v. Hilton-Davis. 
855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988). One looks to the 
"object of the bargain" -- the object purchased or bargained 
for by the plaintiff, in determining whether additions 
constitute "other property." Saratoga, 117 S.Ct. at 1791 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) citing King, 855 F.2d at 1051 
(character of plaintiff's loss may determine the nature of 
available remedies thus when loss is solely the benefit of 
the bargain, a contract remedy is sufficient), American 
Eagle Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 48 F.3d 142, 
145 (5th Cir. 1995) (Texas law), Shipco, 825 F.2d at 928. 
We conclude then that every component that was the 
benefit of the bargain should be integrated into the product; 
consequently, there is no "other property." However, we 
distinguish from the product additional parts that are not 
encompassed in the original bargain but are subsequently 
acquired. These should not be integrated. 
 
The question here is whether replacement parts should 
be integrated into the engine whole or not. In 1980, U.S. 
Lines, the prior owner of the Enterprise, contracted for a 
fully-functioning diesel engine. The commercial parties were 
well aware that a diesel engine contains components that 
are renewable, i.e., that must be replaced within the life of 
the engine. Thus, the benefit of U.S. Lines' bargain in 1980 
was a fully-functioning engine, but with the knowledge that 
certain parts would have to be replaced after a certain time. 
In 1988, when Sea-Land purchased the ship, the product it 
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purchased was the same -- a functioning engine containing 
certain parts that would have to be replaced. See Saratoga, 
117 S.Ct. at 1788 (holding that a subsequent purchase 
does not change the nature of the original product). 
 
Sea-Land asserts, however, that upon its 1990 purchase 
of the connecting rod, it already owned the engine as pre- 
existing property, purchased in 1988. The 1990 property, 
the rod, caused damage to the 1988 property, the engine, 
and thus East River does not bar tort recovery. To support 
this position, Sea-Land depends on a single district court 
case, Lease Navajo, Inc. v. Cap Aviation, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 
455, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that component part 
procured to be installed during overhaul of plaintiff's 
engine was separate property from plaintiff 's engine). 
Under Sea-Land's reading of the "benefit of the bargain" 
analysis, it bargained in 1988 for a properly functioning 
engine, and it got it. In 1990, it bargained for a properly 
functioning connecting rod. It didn't get it. Each bargain 
was a separate transaction, relating to separate property. 
The fact that GE happened to be the manufacturer of these 
two products is irrelevant. Thus, Sea-Land asserts that the 
district court's conclusion that the "essential object of the 
bargain was for a functional GE engine," April 29, 1996 
opinion at 12-13, was erroneous. 
 
Sea-Land has not convinced us, however, that there is 
any rational reason to deviate from the integrated product 
rule simply because the defective component happens to be 
a replacement part instead of the part originally supplied 
with the product. The law is clear that if a commercial 
party purchases all of the components at one time, 
regardless of who assembles them, they are integrated into 
one product. Saratoga, 117 S.Ct. at 1788. Since all 
commercial parties are aware that replacement parts will be 
necessary, the integrated product should encompass those 
replacement parts when they are installed in the engine. 
See Exxon, 835 F.Supp. at 1201 (rejecting the distinction 
between a separately purchased replacement part and the 
originally supplied components as irrelevant to determining 
whether "other property" has been damaged). 
 
Sea-Land would, however, have us believe that the 
difference in timing is dispositive. Sea-Land asserts that, 
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even though component parts may be integrated into the 
end, bargained-for product, as the propeller and rudder 
components were integrated into the completed vessel in 
Shipco, 825 F.2d at 928-29, the later addition of 
replacement parts is a new product. 
 
We disagree. It is a common commercial practice for the 
parties to a transaction to contemplate the integration of 
replacement parts subsequent to a purchase. In the instant 
case, it was expected that all the replacement parts would 
be eventually have to be integrated into the engine. The GE 
connecting rod was purchased to be installed and to 
become integrated with the GE engine. It is a component of 
that engine; it has no use to Sea-Land otherwise. Moreover, 
in purchasing and installing replacement parts, the parties 
can, as with the original purchase, negotiate the terms of 
the sale and of any warranties. 
 
Sea-Land, nevertheless, interprets the "object of the 
bargain" test under a contract-based paradigm -- because 
the engine and the rod were purchased in separate 
contractual transactions (each with its own potential 
warranty), they should be treated as separate property. For 
purposes of contract law, and consequently a breach of 
warranty claim, Sea-Land is correct -- the engine and the 
rod are separate property, each subject to the terms of its 
respective contract. However, the use of separate contracts 
as an indicator of "other property" for purposes of invoking 
tort law, has been rejected by the Supreme Court. East 
River, 106 S.Ct. at 2300 (explaining that a single integrated 
machine can have many components, implicitly each 
procured in separate transactions); Saratoga, 117 S.Ct. at 
1788 (citing Shipco with approval); see also, American Home 
Assur. Co. v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 448 
(8th Cir. 1995) (entire turbine was "single product 
fabricated under a series of subcontracts"); Exxon, 835 
F.Supp. at 1201 ( "spare and replacement parts may . . . be 
part of the `object of the bargain' regardless of whether or 
not they are purchased under the same contract"). 
 
Additionally, the harm that Sea-Land seeks to recover -- 
economic loss -- is the exact type of injury that East River 
explains should be the subject of a contract-based warranty 
suit, not a tort suit. 106 S.Ct. at 2300. Tort law is intended 
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to compensate individuals where the harm goes beyond 
failed expectations into personal and other property injury. 
Id. The timing of the purchase of the component part may 
be relevant, but it is not dispositive. 
 
For all these reasons, we agree with the district court 
that tort law is not applicable as a basis here to recover for 
damage to the diesel engine. We will affirm the district 
court's holding that there was no damage to "other 
property." Id. at 2302. 
 
III. Duty To Warn 
 
We next address the question whether Sea-Land can 
make a claim in negligence against GE on the basis of a 
post-sale duty to warn of a defective product. In McConnell 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F.Supp. 1520 (D.N.J. 1986), 
a district court attempted to carve out such an exception to 
East River. Plaintiffs in McConnell suffered economic loss: 
lost profits and damage to their engine because of a 
defective engine crankshaft. They asserted not that 
defendants negligently manufactured the crankshaft but 
that "defendants negligently failed to warn of a known 
defect in the crankshaft." Id. at 1526. The district court in 
the instant case endorsed this exception to East River and 
held that there may be tort liability for post-sale failure to 
warn, even if the damage is only economic, when the seller 
has actual knowledge of the defect. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of GE because it found 
that GE did not have actual knowledge of the defect. We 
disagree with the reasoning of the district court, but we will 
affirm the grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
 
The Court in East River enunciated an unconditional bar 
of all tort recovery for economic loss arising out of a 
defective product. 
 
       We . . . hold that a manufacturer in a commercial 
       relationship has no duty under either a negligence or 
       strict product-liability theory to prevent a product from 
       injuring itself. 
 
East River, 106 S.Ct. at 2302. The Court further explained, 
"whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products 
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liability claim lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed 
is economic loss." East River, 106 S.Ct at 2304. 
 
As we have set out in Section II above, the reason for this 
rule is that the parties to such a bargain can set the terms 
of their expectations through negotiations, contract 
provisions, price adjustments, and insurance. If either 
party deems it advisable to require warning of a known 
defect in order to protect the product, that party can 
negotiate for such a provision or can protect against a 
defect through insurance. The rule in East River is directly 
applicable. 
 
In rejecting this duty to warn claim, we are not, however, 
discounting the duty of a manufacturer to warn of a defect 
in order to protect the persons using the product or the 
public in general. We agree that we, as a society, should 
attempt to provide every incentive for a manufacturer with 
knowledge that a defective product is on the market to 
warn its customers. If the damage, resulting from a defect 
is other than mere economic loss, East River leaves intact 
all tort-based theories of recovery including, but not limited 
to, duty to warn. 
 
Where, however, damage from a defect is only to the 
product itself and is only economic, there is no tort 
recovery. The policy of economic loss is better adjusted by 
contract rules than by tort principles. This conclusion is as 
true for strict liability and negligence cases as it is for 
failure to warn cases. Thus, a manufacturer may be 
culpable of a failure to warn, but if the damage is solely to 
the product itself and is solely economic, there is no tort 
recovery. See East River, 106 S.Ct. at 2300. Accordingly, we 
reject the holding in McConnell. We will, however, for the 
reasons stated above affirm the district court's granting of 
summary judgment to GE on the duty to warn claim. 
 
IV. Negligent Repair 
 
We address, third and finally, Sea-Land's claim for 
negligent repair of the damaged engine. Following failure of 
the connecting rod, GE repaired the damaged engine. In 
November 1994, the engine failed again. The failure was 
found to be at the location of the 1991 engine block repair. 
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Sea-Land asserts that GE negligently performed the repair 
and thus breached a duty of care. The damage Sea-Land 
suffered in 1994 was once again solely economic. 
 
Sea-Land attempts to distinguish its negligent repair case 
from East River, by arguing that GE was not acting as a 
"manufacturer" and did not supply a "product" which 
injured itself. We are not persuaded. GE repaired the 
engine free of charge in 1991 because of the defect in the 
replacement connecting rod. The district court dismissed 
the negligent repair claim because the sole damages alleged 
were economic. It held that, pursuant to East River, "no 
products-liability claim lies in admiralty when the only 
injury claimed is economic loss." April 17, 1997 opinion at 
13, citing East River, 106 S.Ct. at 2304. The district court 
found that plaintiff's remedy lay in contract, not tort. For 
the reasons we expressed in Sections II and III above, we 
agree. Despite any negligence or culpability on the part of 
a manufacturer, where damage is only to the product itself 
and where the only loss is economic, there is no basis for 
tort recovery. The parties must seek their remedy under 
contract and warranty law. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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